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Appellant. 
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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
CARLOS JOHNSON, 
-vs.-
S.M. COVEY, 
Respondent, I 
Appellant. ~ 
Case No. 7988 
PETITION FOR RE-HEARING 
To attorneys not participating in an appeal, terse 
decisions have a certain satisfaction and are mildly hu-
morous. If the Supreme Court can dispose of a contested 
appeal in a half page decision, the attorneys for the appel-
lant should have been smart enough to foresee the simpli-
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city of the questions and the ease with which the court 
would dispose of the appeal. Hence, other attorneys are 
mildly amused that counsel get so wrapped up in their 
view of the case that they cannot appreciate its insigni-
ficance. 
A terse disposition of a case on appeal suggests three 
alternatives: 
(1) The amount involved is so small as not to be 
worth the court's attention. 
( 2) The questions involved are so obvious as not 
to require discussion. 
( 3) The court has misconceived the basis of the 
appeal. 
As to the first point and its application to the case 
at hand, there may be some merit, since the appeal in-
volves some $1,700.00. This, however, is a question for 
the legislature and up to now with cases arising in the 
District Court the right of appeal has not been limited. 
( 2) The case may be so simple as to present no 
reasonable doubt. It was obviously on this basis that the 
court disposed of the cause as it cited only two cases, the 
principles of both of which are conceded by appellant~ 
in the briefs, are conceded now and were roneeded in the 
District Court. 
The court says, "there was sufficient evidence in the 
record to support such conclusion under familiar prin-
ciples enunciated by this court," the conelusion lwing thnt 
the plaintiff and respondent "owned tlw pipe pnrrha~Pd 
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with hi~ 1noney." The court cites Toomer's Estate v. 
Union Pacific Railroad, 239 Pac. 2d, 163. At page 165 
this court said, "'The jury, having found the issues in 
favor of the plaintiff, he is entitled to have us consider 
all of the evidence, and every inference and intendment 
fairly arising therefron1 in the light 1nost favorable to 
him." \Vith this statement of the law there is no quarrel. 
The question appellant raised was whether there was any 
competent or credible evidence to support the trial court. 
On the second question in the case involving confu-
sion of goods, the court cites ~llanti City Savings Bank v. 
Peterson, 33 Utah 209, 93 Pac. 566, which holds that 
where leased sheep are inter1ningled with sheep of the 
lessee and are not capable of identification the lessor and 
lessee becmne tenants in cmnmon. There is no dispute 
as to this staten1ent of the law. The question raised by 
the appeal was, assuming the intermingling of personal 
property so as to result in a confusion of goods or ten-
ancy in common, what right does one of the parties have 
to divide the property and control his own share, leaving 
the other party to worry about his own 1 The opinion 
doesn't even recognize this question. Manti Bank v. 
Peterson holds an owner has the right of replevin, where 
all preliminaries are met, and does not charge the segre-
gator with responsibility for the balance. 
( 3) The court has misconceived the basis of the 
appeal. The Com;;titution of the State of Utah does not 
require elaborate opinions fron1 the Supreme Court but 
~ays in Article VIII, Section 25, that "the reasons there-
for shall he stated concisely in writing* * *." 
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If the Supreme Court has followed this constitu-
tional exhortation then it has not decided the case pre-
sented by appellant, because its reasons do not deal with 
either of the questions raised on the appeal. 
It is our view that appellant is entitled to a decision 
on whether the evidence in behalf of the plaintiff is 
credible and probative, or whether, as contended by the 
appellant, it was composed entirely of gratuitous and 
incompetent statements of ultimate fact, shown by the 
evidence of the respondent himself to have been based 
upon surmise and wishfulness, the statement being com-
pletely destroyed by the foundation evidence in the case. 
We are not so wasteful of client's money and our reputa-
tion that we would appeal a case on a question of fact 
with conflicting, con1petent evidence. We believe we are 
entitled also to a decision as to the rights of a person 
whose personal property has become confused with that 
of others, and not simply a statement that where goods 
have been confused each of the contributors owns a frac-
tional part thereof, and that proceeds from a sale shall be 
divided proportionately. rrhat is only the beginning of 
the problem. Realizing that this is the law generally, 
is it not also the law in F tah that an owner of inter-
mingled and confused goods has the right to make a 
segregation, controlling his own property and ignoring-
the balance T 
If the court in a terse decision would state its an-
swers to these two questions, at least the law woulrl ht· 
made plain. Counsel for a litigant are entitled to rPly 
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on decided cases in advising their clients, and are en-
titled to assu1ne that this court will state that they have 
misconceived the law, that the facts do not support their 
contention, or that new law is being established. 
Does the court 1nean to hold, that where two owners 
of drill pipe haYl' inter1ningled their indistinguishable 
pieces of pipe, the only remedy either one has is to sell 
all or a part of the pipe and hold the proceeds in the same 
proportion as the original pile of pipe~ Does the court 
mean to suggest that the appellant had no right to go to 
Vernal, li tah, and take possession of his proper share of 
the intenningled pipe, leaving the rest where it was~ 
Or does the court hold in its decision that appellant is to 
be punished because in segregating the pipe he mistaken-
ly took nwre than his proper share 1 Our view of the 
facts and the law is that if appellant had segregated only 
his proper share the respondent would have received 
nothing and could not complain because of his own negli-
gence. Appellant's mistake in segregating more than his 
proper share has actually benefitted the respondent, be-
cause the surplus is available to respondent. 
rrhe court sustains the finding that respondent owned 
25.17% of the confused mass. That means appellant 
owned 74.83% of the pipe piled in the rig after the well 
was abandoned. The trial court found there was 5,890 
feet of good pipe worth $1.50 per foot. Of this appellant 
owned 74.83%, or the equivalent of 4,407.5 feet, worth 
$6,611.25. 
'Vhen the rig was being sold and dismantled appel-
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lant wanted to protect and did protect his share of the 
pipe, as he had a right to do. (Cases cited by appellant 
in his Brief, pp. 35-38.) This share was as specified, and 
any arnount segregated in addition to his share was the 
pipe of respondent. The tenancy in common was termi-
nated and all of appellant's share was in the pile segre-
gated. The pipe left in the rig was respondent's alone 
and the loss of it was respondent's loss. 
Therefore the proceeds of sale of the segregated 
pipe belonged $6,611.25 to appellant, and the balance to 
respondent, after making proportionate reductions for 
the cost of keeping and expenses of sale. Appellant's 
share was 661125 ths, or 83.4%. Costs of sale and storage 
of $815.00 (paid by appellant) should be apportioned ac-
cordingly. 16.6% of that amount or $135.29 is chargeable 
to respondent. Therefore, assuming the good pipe to be 
only in the amount found by the trial court, respondent 
should be allowed a maxirnum of $1,173.83, and appellant 
should retain the remainder. 
The law seems to us to be definite that partial own-
ers of confused goods have the right of segregation, in-
cluding the right to accomplish the segregation hy re-
plevin action. Assuming this right, there is no authority 
cited by the court or by the respondent that a party nd-
ing in good faith will be penalized because he took morP 
than his share. The cases properly hold that only the :-~ur­
plus portion is held for the benefit of the other part~·. 
We cannot compel a re-hearing, but submit that thP 
court has not decided the questions presented hy the 
record on appeal. 
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A~ to the other point raised by the record, namely, 
"'Yho owned the pipe?'', the court might very well be 
ten1pted to say, there is no evidence that appellant owned 
the pipe and appellant therefore cannot complain if the 
true owner failed to con1e forth and establish his owner-
ship. Or the court might conceivably say, the evidence 
supporting respondent would not be sufficient to estab-
lish ownership against nf. E. Baird or Baird and Rob-
bins Company, but as against appellant the court is not 
disposed to be too fussy. Such an attitude might not 
~ati~fy appellant, but at least it would lay the matter at 
re~t. The inappropriate statement of the court in this 
case simply indicates that this court is not concerned with 
the difference between credible and probative evidence 
and evidence which is known by the witness to be false 
and without foundation, and right in the teeth of the 
basic facts in the case which establish ownership of the 
pipe in Baird and Robbins Drilling Company. The name 
of Johnson was never used in the purchase of the pipe, 
and .Johnson's loan of money to Baird and Robbins was 
definitely and finally resolved in a promissory note with 
a ~ecurity guarantee, which is Exhibit "C", and which 
establishes Baird and Robbins as the owner of the pipe 
in a docun1ent produced by respondent from his own 
possession and E'Ubmitted as the controlling document in 
the case. 
Thi~ i~ the question on ownership: A loaned $2,-
500.00 to R to enable B to buy drill pipe. B purchased 
the pipe in his own name (under a rental or purchase 
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option) and proceeded to use it. B later agreed in writing 
to repay A $2,800.00 and to keep the pipe on the premises 
until the loan is repaid. B went broke and abandoned 
the premises, leaving the drill pipe in place. Does A own 
the pipe~ If the court thinks so, it sliould say so, and 
not duck the question by saying the evidence is conflict-
ing. For A to testify, with the above the admitted facts, 
that he owns the pipe, cannot be evidence of ownership 
but only a layman's claim of ownership. But if the court 
accepts such a self-serving claim as evidence why should 
it not say so~ That would be establishing law. 
Appellant suggests that he is entitled to have the 
court decide the case on the facts and law presented, and 
not be shrugged off with an opinion which does not even 
recognize the questions raised by the appeal. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICHARDS AND BIRD 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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